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Comparative analysis of COVID-19
guidelines from six countries: a qualitative
study on the US, China, South Korea, the
UK, Brazil, and Haiti
Ji Youn Yoo1*†, Samia Valeria Ozorio Dutra2†, Dany Fanfan3, Sarah Sniffen4, Hao Wang5, Jamile Siddiqui6,
Hyo-Suk Song7, Sung Hwan Bang8, Dong Eun Kim9, Shihoon Kim10 and Maureen Groer1

Abstract
Background: In late January, a worldwide crisis known as COVID-19 was declared a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern by the WHO. Within only a few weeks, the outbreak took on pandemic proportions, affecting
over 100 countries. It was a significant issue to prevent and control COVID-19 on both national and global scales
due to the dramatic increase in confirmed cases worldwide. Government guidelines provide a fundamental
resource for communities, as they guide citizens on how to protect themselves against COVID-19, however, they
also provide critical guidance for policy makers and healthcare professionals on how to take action to decrease the
spread of COVID-19. We aimed to identify the differences and similarities between six different countries’ (US, China,
South Korea, UK, Brazil and Haiti) government-provided community and healthcare system guidelines, and to
explore the relationship between guideline issue dates and the prevalence/incidence of COVID-19 cases.
Methods: To make these comparisons, this exploratory qualitative study used document analysis of government
guidelines issued to the general public and to healthcare professionals. Documents were purposively sampled
(N = 55) and analyzed using content analysis.
Results: The major differences in the evaluation and testing criteria in the guidelines across the six countries
centered around the priority of testing for COVID-19 in the general population, which was strongly dependent on each
country’s healthcare capacity. However, the most similar guidelines pertained to the clinical signs and symptoms of
COVID-19, and methods to prevent its contraction.
(Continued on next page)
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Conclusion: In the initial stages of the outbreak, certain strategies were universally employed to control the deadly
virus’s spread, including quarantining the sick, contact tracing, and social distancing. However, each country dealt with
differing healthcare capacities, risks, threats, political and socioeconomic challenges, and distinct healthcare systems
and infrastructure. Acknowledging these differences highlights the importance of examining the various countries’
response to the COVID-19 pandemic with a nuanced view, as each of these factors shaped the government guidelines
distributed to each country’s communities and healthcare systems.
Keywords: COVID-19, Coronavirus, Government guidelines, Outbreak COVID-19, Pandemic

Introduction
The recent outbreak of COVID-19 has led to a major
concern of increased mortality in the world. The first
outbreak of COVID-19 was reported in Wuhan city, the
capital of China’s Hubei Province, in late December,
2019 [1]. Only a few months later, on March 11, 2020,
the World Health Organization (WHO) designated the
COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic and provided guidelines for COVID-19 case management in the health facility and community. Globally, approximately 3,506,577
confirmed cases of COVID-19 have been reported, including over 247,467 deaths (Johns Hopkins University,
May 03, 2020) [2, 3]. The fast spread of the virus reflects
how health is connected globally and the necessity of
investing in global research efforts to explore, clarify,
and address global health emergencies.
When the first COVID-19 outbreak was reported in
China, the Chinese government established guidelines
that recommended keeping social distance in public
places, staying at home, and isolating infected populations to contain the epidemic. After a month, South
Korea was assailed by a COVID-19 outbreak. Both governments’ early actions were aggressive in an attempt to
stop the virus from spreading, involving both widespread
testing for the virus and contact tracing. The COVID-19
response in China and South Korea provided the model
for other countries where COVID-19 was just beginning
to expand. While it was uncertain whether other countries could implement or adapt the stringent measures
endorsed by China and South Korea, the heterogeneous
nature of the virus worldwide warranted further investigation into the healthcare and community responses
from governments across many nations.
Considering how each country had different capacities,
risks, threats, political and socioeconomic challenges, as
well as different health care systems, it was unsurprising
that each country responded to this threat with different
measures and different timings. However, it is also
clearly critically important to look at how different
countries addressed the first pandemic of coronavirus.
Thus, we compared six different countries’ guidelines to
investigate their management, incidence, and prevalence
of COVID-19 cases. Additionally, we explored the

relationship between the guidelines’ issue dates and the
prevalence-incidence curves of the different countries.
Objective

The objective was to compare government guidelines on
COVID-19 by six different countries (The United States
(US), China, South Korea, The United Kingdom (UK),
Brazil and Haiti). This included general public guidelines
and healthcare professionals’ (medical institutions)
guidelines. We aimed to identify differences and similarities between the countries’ community and healthcare
professional guidelines and additionally to explore the
relationship between guidelines issue dates and the
prevalence/incidence of the COVID-19 cases. This is significant because we can examine how various countries
responded to COVID-19 and identify best practices.
This approach also allows us to understand how healthcare system and policy capacities shape COVID-19 responses and to share this information to improve
responses to COVID-19.

Methods
Research design

Our study used document analysis, a standard qualitative
research method for evaluating communication and policy research, to explore the differences and similarities
between government COVID-19 guidelines from six
countries [4, 5]. The following steps were included in
the analysis: (i) establishing the document inclusion criteria, (ii) gathering documents, (iii) analyzing key areas,
(iv) coding the document, (v) verification, and (vi) analysis [6]. In this approach, the investigators are the primary means of data selection and analysis. This study
used purposive sampling to recruit investigators internationally by email and/or phone.
Country selection

COVID-19 is a global pandemic warranting a crossnational perspective from countries differing on several
levels (e.g., geographic region, health and economic resources, stage of COVID-19 spread and response) to
maximize range and diversity when exploring the scope
of COVID-19-related community and healthcare system
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guidelines. When selecting the six countries, the following were considered: 1) COVID-19 starting and spiking
period, 2) geographic proximity to China, where the
COVID-19 spread began, 3) population size, 4) gross domestic product (GDP) status, and 5) eligibility of a bilingual expert in the public health field. For instance, the
first COVID-19 outbreak occurred in China in December 2019. Outbreaks in other countries like South Korea,
the US, and the UK soon followed in January and February 2020. Finally, in March 2020, Brazil and Haiti noted
increased incidence and deaths from the virus. By April
2020, China and South Korea were in the recovery stage
of the pandemic while the spread of COVID-19 intensified in countries such as the US, UK, Haiti and Brazil.
Geographical differences in the selected countries
reflected geographic proximity to China (Korea), largest
population in North America (the US), largest population in South America (Brazil), and island countries with
significant geographic distance from China (Haiti and
the UK). Furthermore, the countries’ population sizes
were strongly related to the effectiveness and widespread
dissemination of information regarding COVID-19
guidelines [6]. Additionally, the countries’ GDP represented their resources, ability, and strategies employed
in response to COVID-19. For instance, at the start of
the COVID-19 spread in the UK and Haiti, both countries had very little available resources for COVID testing. With Haiti’s fragile health care system, Haiti did not
have the infrastructure to fight the spread of the virus,
warranting economic support from other countries. Finally, it was necessary to collaborate with authors who
met the following inclusion criteria in order to facilitate
document analysis of different countries’ government
guidelines: hold a graduate degree, have experience with
healthcare material, are fluent in English and have native
language fluency (Chinese, Korean, Portuguese, and
French/ Haitian Creole) in at least one of the six countries selected.

Document inclusion/exclusion criteria

Six members of the research team, which consisted of
multidisciplinary, cross-cultural researchers, collected
the data. The research team only reviewed documents
from publicly available government websites for each
country (see Additional file 1). Guidelines from government websites were available in different formats, including action and response plans, healthcare and
general population guidelines, prevention measures/recommendation flyers, videos, government memos and
webpages. Documents or information from nongovernment websites, social media, online newspapers/editorials, peer-reviewed articles, and heath institution
guidelines were excluded from the study.
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Data collection

To guide document selection among investigators, a codebook was developed which highlighted the information
necessary for each theme (see Additional files 2 and 3).
Each document for each country was reviewed to determine the extent to which the document provided answers
to at least one of the pre-identified themes (i.e. areas of
analysis). The team reviewed government websites weekly
for approximately 6 weeks from March 2020–May 2020 to
obtain information from government guidelines, and to
ascertain whether any new documents were published, or
whether old guidelines had been updated. A total of 55
documents (e.g., government guidelines, flyers, memo,
webpages) were reviewed to extract data (10 for the US, 3
for China, 10 for South Korea, 8 for the UK, 13 for Brazil,
11 for Haiti) (see Additional file 1). Texts from COVID-19
general public guidelines and government health promotion materials relevant to each pre-identified theme were
copied verbatim in their original language and added to
an excel spreadsheet. Extracted verbatim texts written in a
language other than English (Portuguese, Chinese, Korean,
and Haitian Creole/French) were translated to English by
bilingual members of the research team and added to the
excel spreadsheet to allow for review and analysis of the
information as a group (see Additional file 3). Text translation focused primarily on maintaining meaning consistent with health care language rather than cultural
nuances, thus, formal translation procedures (e.g., forward
and back translation) were not completed. The authors
evaluated the English translations, providing constructive
feedback about the translation, and confirmed their validity through governmental and professional guidelines and
articles.
Data analysis

Key areas of analysis were articulated in the codebook,
which provided a list of codes (e.g., themes and subthemes) and included six basic components: the code, a
brief definition, a full definition, guidelines for when to
use or not use the code, and examples of the code. Explicitly, the codebook helped the research team determine the meanings of themes and provided clarity about
what to look for within the text of the guidelines. The
codes’ sensitivity and specificity were used as a tool for
measuring the adequacy of answers to research questions. Data analysis entailed appraising and synthesizing
texts from guidelines, which were then organized into
major themes and sub-categories through content analysis [7]. Content analysis within the research team was
facilitated through online meetings, which were convenient and removed geographic barriers. Researchers
assessed the data for coding patterns (e.g., similarity, differences, frequency) across different countries regarding
their government guidelines for the general public and
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healthcare professionals. All texts from guidelines were
allocated deductively to the a priori themes (deductive
codes). During the iterative content analysis process,
new themes also emerged (inductive codes). When disagreement ensued during data analysis, the research
team recoded, or the primary coder sought advice from
another team member for verification and clarification
[7]. The original data of the confirmed and deaths cases
were downloaded from the Johns Hopkins University
Center for Systems Science and Engineering [3]. Tableau, a well-known website for analyzing big data, was
used to clean and reshape the data for sharing with the
public. The data was then converted to excel files and
used to create figures (see Additional file 4) [8].
Trustworthiness of the data

We established trustworthiness of the data by: 1) focusing on government guidelines, as they are a credible
source of information (credibility), 2) using information
from guidelines, which maintain dependable and consistent patterns over time and are periodically updated to
reflect the evolving understanding of the coronavirus
(dependability), 3) using government guidelines, which
limited the research team’s bias at the data collection
and interpretation level, and improved accuracy with the
use of a well-developed codebook (confirmability), and
4) analyzing the guidelines of six countries experiencing
the coronavirus pandemic at the same time but within
different contextual realities (transferability) [9, 10].

Results
Theme: Evaluation and testing
Sub-them: Screening criteria

When comparing the different government guidelines
on screening for signs and symptoms in suspected
COVID-19 cases, all countries listed respiratory symptoms as a criterion and the majority – Brazil being the
exception – emphasized fever, as well. Interestingly, the
US and UK did not list travel history as a criterion. We
also noticed that the US and Brazil did not categorize
pneumonia as a screening criterion, whereas South
Korea, the UK and Haiti emphasized unknown case of
pneumonia, clinical or radiological evidence of pneumonia, and bronchopneumonia. A major distinction the authors noted was that only China and the UK specified
the detection of suspected COVID-19 cases within the
hospital through either radiological evidence via chest
X-ray and thoracic Computed Tomography (CT) or
lymphocyte counts. Haiti, as of April 20, 2020, expanded
the screening criterion from ‘have a fever greater than
38°C within the last 10 days’ to ‘anyone with fever
greater than or equal to 38 °C (see Additional file 3).’
Haiti’s screening criteria also included body aches, sudden changes in taste (ageusia) or smell (anosmia),
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possibility of coming in contact with a healthcare professional diagnosed with COVID-19, or being an occupant
of a high risk area while experiencing symptoms compatible with COVID-19 (see Table 1).
Although information about contact with suspected
and/or confirmed cases was vital for screening criterion
in most countries, the US and UK did not include this.
Furthermore, specifically examining symptomatic patients aged over 65 or who had underlying conditions
was only found in the US guidelines (see Table 1). Of
note, South Korea created a new category in addition to
the suspected cases called the Patient Under Investigation (PUI) on April 03, 2020. A PUI is a person who has
an epidemiologic link to a collective outbreak of
COVID-19 in an area, or a possible contact to a
COVID-19 positive person. The US used the term PUI
to describe people who exhibit symptoms, or were
otherwise suspected of having COVID-19, but had not
yet been confirmed via laboratory testing.
Theme: Evaluation and testing
Sub-theme: Screening center types

Across different countries, we identified three different
types of screening centers: healthcare facilities, drivethrough screening clinics, and walk-through screening
clinics. While walk-through screening clinics were available in South Korea, healthcare facilities were the only
screening centers available in Brazil and Haiti. Interestingly, Brazil and China did create other satellite facilities
for treatment, even though they did not create separate
facilities for screening. The US, UK and South Korea
conducted drive-through screening clinics.
In particular, South Korea took a distinctly different
approach to managing suspected COVID-19 cases. Patients with respiratory symptoms that fit the COVID-19
suspected case criteria were blocked from entering the
designated healthcare facilities (called the Public Relief
Hospital System) and were redirected to other COVID19 screening/test centers, or if the hospital was a screening center itself, the patient suspected of having
COVID-19 was directed to use a specific entrance for
COVID-19 screening before entering the main hospital
building. The purpose of establishing the Public Relief
Hospital System was to provide safe hospital environments protected against COVID-19 spread. In other
words, this was an attempt to block patients with
COVID-19 from spreading the virus to general patients
who did not have COVID-19.
Theme: Infection control
Sub-theme: General outpatient guidance

Outpatients are patients outside of the hospital who
need periodical medical attention due to other morbidities (hypertension, cancer, HIV/AIDS, etc.). In South
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Table 1 Evaluation & testing; COVID-19 symptoms screening criteria
Countries

Fever

Respiratory
symptoms

Pneumonia

Clinical evidence

Contact with
confirmed
cases

Contact
with
suspected
cases

Travel history

Patients
Patients with
aged over underlying
65 with
conditions
symptoms

US

>
100.4 °F
/ 38 °C

Cough, difficulty
breathing

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

With
symptoms

With
underlying
conditions

China

Fever

Any respiratory
symptoms

Multiple patchy
shadows and
interstitial changes
at the lungs

CT imaging features
of COVID-19 / either
WBC or lymphocyte
count decreases

Within 14 days
before the
onset of the
disease

Within 14
days before
the onset of
the disease

Within 14 days
before the
onset of the
disease

N/A

N/A

South
Korea

≥37.5 °C Coughing, difficulty
breathing

Unknow case of
pneumonia

N/A

Within 14 days Within 14
with respiratory days with
symptoms
respiratory
symptoms

Within 14 days
with
respiratory
symptoms

N/A

N/A

UK (Only
≥37.8 °C Persistent cough (with
for
or without sputum),
inpatients)
hoarseness, nasal
discharge or
congestion, shortness
of breath, sore throat,
wheezing, sneezing

Clinical or
radiological
evidence of
pneumonia

Acute respiratory
distress syndrome
or influenza

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Brazil

N/A

Coughing, runny nose,
difficulty breathing

N/A

N/A

***

Possible
patients

Travel abroad
in the last 14
days

N/A

N/A

Haiti

≥38 °C

Cough with or without
respiratory difficulties,
headache, body aches,
sudden changes in
taste and smell

Acute upper
N/A
respiratory
infection with a
tendency to
develop pneumonia
or bronchopneumonia

Within 14 days
with flu
symptoms

N/A

N/A

Possibly having Contact
had contact
with a sick
with a
person
confirmed
COVID-19

All the information was only extracted from the government’s guidelines. Information from public news or other heath institution guidelines were exclude
The terms were extracted directly from the government guidelines. N/A represents the information did not indicate in the guidelines
*** The Brazil government considers that contact with possible patients would include contact with confirmed cases

Korea, outpatients who require healthcare service due to
non-COVID-19 diseases were directed to the Public Relief Hospital for follow-up or to see a doctor. These outpatients were strictly separated from patients with any
respiratory symptoms.
In Brazil and the US, outpatients were advised to call
ahead of their appointment time and were asked
whether they had experienced symptoms of respiratory
infection. The UK and Haiti avoided treating outpatients
in their healthcare facilities. Still, the UK continued with
outpatient appointments either through video or phone
clinics. Chinese patients, on the other hand, could make
an appointment via the phone or online and could then
complete their appointment in the hospital as long as
the patient made the appointment with a specialist and
avoided using the emergency room (ER) or fever clinics
where COVID-19 patients had been treated. Haiti did
not provide recommendations regarding whether outpatients should make appointments with clinics, and outpatient services were unavailable to the general
population. However, Haiti did provide some guidance
for those with HIV/AIDS, as Haiti has a high number of
individuals suffering from HIV/AIDS. The US updated
their guidelines in April 13, 2020, advising healthcare facilities to implement alternatives to face-to-face triage

and visits, and instructing patients to utilize cloth face
coverings regardless of symptoms upon entry to a
healthcare facility. However, the guideline did not specify what alternatives were implemented.
Theme: Cost support
Sub-theme: Cost support

Financial support for testing and treatment was provided
mainly or totally by the government in South Korea, the
UK, and Brazil. In Haiti, the Haitian government, the
US, and the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors,
in conjunction with several international and private organizations, donated money to cover the cost of the
country’s COVID-19 response. In China, an individual’s
medical cost was subsidized based on the subsidy policy
of the local area if the patient was suspected of having
COVID-19. However, once the patient received confirmation of COVID-19 infection, the medical cost was subsidized by the authorities. The cost of the clinic visit and
testing was made free for all US citizens regardless of insurance status, per The Families First Coronavirus Response Act, which required private and federal insurance
to pay for Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved testing, and for testing to be free to those who
were uninsured. The extent to which the COVID-19
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treatment was covered differed between insurance
companies.

Theme: Evaluation and testing
Sub-theme: Confirmation of COVID-19

All six countries performed real time PCR to confirm
COVID-19 cases. Uniquely, the UK did not provide testing for COVID-19 to the community (at the time of
writing), and instead reserved testing for National Health
Service (NHS) staff, their relatives and – later in the
pandemic – select essential workers. Some unique types
of confirmatory lab tests were via virus isolation in
South Korea, virus gene sequencing in China, and serological examination in Brazil, Haiti, and the US.
Brazil made the decision to include epidemiological
criteria, meaning a confirmed case could be included if
the individual met clinical criteria and epidemiological
evidence, despite a lack of confirmatory laboratory testing for COVID-19. The US, however, made the distinction that an individual who met those guidelines was
considered a probable case. The US also described probable cases as a person meeting the presumptive laboratory evidence and either the clinical criteria or the
epidemiological evidence. Finally, an individual could be
considered a probable case by the US if their vital records, as in their death certificate, indicated the person
died of causes related to COVID-19, despite not having
a confirmed laboratory test result.

Theme: Triage protocols
Sub-theme: Hospital admission criteria

All countries’ hospitalization decisions were made on a
case-by-case basis. While Haiti’s hospitalization criteria
were not specified by the government, Brazil relied on
post-collection medical evaluation for hospitalization decisions. The Chinese guideline did not indicate hospital
admission criteria. The US recommended hospitalization
of people with severe symptoms: septic shock, sepsis,
pneumonia, hypoxemic respiratory failure, acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), and cardiomyopathy,
etc. The UK required either clinical evidence of pneumonia or radiological evidence with a high suspicion for
COVID-19, with ARDS-like or influenza-like symptoms
for hospitalization.
Uniquely, South Korea created three different categories, ranging from moderate, severe, to extremely severe
for hospitalization. Asymptomatic COVID-19 positive
individuals or those with mild symptoms were sent to
the Living Treatment Center, a facility that monitored
symptoms twice a day and transferred support to the
hospital in the event of a worsening of symptom
severity.

Page 6 of 16

Theme: Infection control
Sub-theme: Healthcare triage isolation

All six countries developed an isolated area for screening
and follow up for symptomatic patients in order to isolate suspected cases. Brazil and the US advised healthcare facilities to place suspected cases in well ventilated
spaces that allowed sufficient space between patients.
South Korea, Haiti, and China organized their healthcare
facilities into different levels of care according to the absence or presence of respiratory symptoms. More specifically, China categorized triage isolation areas into those
for confirmed, suspected, or non-COVID-19 patients.
Theme: Infection control
Sub-theme: Visitor access to healthcare facilities

In China, visitors were prohibited from accessing healthcare facilities, whereas the UK and South Korea made
exemptions for seriously ill patients receiving end-of-life
care, who were allowed one visitor per ward patient.
Brazil and Haiti limited the number of visitors to the
minimum amount possible, but only Haiti required that
all visitors entering the hospital wear a face mask. Although earlier in the pandemic the US made no recommendations regarding visitor access, by April the US
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) advised hospitals to limit the number of visitors allowed.
Except for China’s guidelines, all countries took extra
precautions towards visitors, establishing protocols for
visitors regarding proper Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE) and hygiene. Although the US CDC guidelines
were not as restrictive as other countries regarding visitor limitations, the US guidelines suggested actively
screening visitors for fever and COVID-19 symptoms
upon entry to healthcare facilities. If COVID-19 symptoms were present, the guidelines advised that the visitor
not be allowed entry to the facility. Similarly, Brazil suggested avoiding entry of visitors with respiratory symptoms. The US CDC and the Brazilian government also
recommended posting visual alerts advising visitors to
wash their hands frequently, limiting visitors to the most
vulnerable patients (i.e. oncology and transplant awards),
encouraging the use of videocall applications in place of
in-person visits, and recommending visitors leave the patient during aerosol generating procedures or other specimen collection procedures. Lastly, Brazil and the US
instructed visitors to only visit the patient’s room, not
any other locations in the facility.

Community guidelines
Theme: Prevent getting sick
Sub themes: Prevent getting sick

Most recommendations to the community on preventing
getting sick were similar between the six different countries. In order to explore the major differences, the sub-
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themes were organized according to singular actions (i.e.
total time washing hands, covering cough and sneezes,
face-cover recommendations, etc.).
Generally, face-cover recommendations changed
throughout the pandemic, however South Korea and
China recommended the use of face masks in public
places from the beginning of the pandemic, even if the
individual was not sick. The UK did not indicate clear
guidance on this matter. The US, Brazil, and Haiti did
not initially recommend wearing a face covering, however, the guidelines were updated by the US CDC on
April 4th, 2020, by the Brazilian Health Ministry on
April 5th, 2020, and by Haiti in the middle of April 2020
to indicate that all people, regardless of whether they
were sick, should wear a cloth face covering in public.
However, medical grade face masks were still not recommended for the community, as they were to be reserved
for health care workers due to shortages.
South Korea, Brazil, Haiti, the US and the UK did not
provide guidance on the sharing of personal items in the
general community guidelines regarding the prevention
of getting sick. China was the only country who mentioned not sharing any personal items to the community
as a method for preventing contraction of COVID-19.
Even though most community guidelines on preventing illness recommended maintaining 1.8–2.0 m of physical distance between people to avoid viral transmission,
Haiti’s guidance on physical distancing initially recommended staying two steps away from other individuals.
Haiti updated their recommendation to staying three
steps away from others on April 20th.

As of April 8th, 2020, as a unique measure to prevent
viral spread, the South Korean government made it
mandatory for all Koreans and long-term stay foreigners
who entered South Korea to (1) be tested for COVID19, (2) install an application on their cell phones: the
Self-quarantine Safety Protection App, and (3) abide by
the guidelines for self-quarantined persons, including
conducting self-diagnosis for a period of 14 days (see
Table 2).
Theme: If you are sick
Sub theme: What to do if you are sick

Based on the guidelines, we were able to extract 8 important terms, including avoid using public transport
and crowded places, isolation days and next steps, face
mask or cloth face covering, use a separate room or bathroom, sharing household items, sick room ventilation,
cleaning instructions, call center for COVID-19 (see
Table 3). These terms were ascertained from at least two
countries’ guidelines.
Five of the countries recommended people with respiratory symptoms stay at home for certain periods,
whereas the Chinese guidelines advised sick people to
immediately go to a designated medical care institution
for testing, and to then follow the quarantine protocols
requested. Each country designated different isolation
periods and procedures. As reported by the US and the
UK governments, people with respiratory symptoms
were to isolate at home and only stop home isolation
under the following conditions; no fever for at least 72 h
without the use of medications that reduced fever,

Table 2 Prevent getting sick
Countries

Total time
of washing
hands

Hand
washing

Cover coughs
and sneezes

Social distance

Face cover/gloves

Avoid touching face with
unwashed hands

US

20 s (until dry
if using hand
sanitizer

Soap, hand
sanitizer (>
60% alcohol)

Elbow or tissue,
6-ft
Immediately wash
your hands or use hand
sanitizer afterward

Cloth face cover (Update
on April 4, 2020)

Avoid touching your eyes,
nose, and mouth with
unwashed hands

China

Keep good
Soap, alcohol- Elbow
hand hygiene based hand
sanitizer

N/A

Disposable medical
Avoid touch face with hands
facemask, Surgical mask, when you uncertain about
Gloves are recommended hands’ cleanness.

South
Korea

More than 30
s

Soap

Elbow

2-m

Facemask

Do not touch your eyes, nose,
or mouth with unwashed
hands

UK

20 s

Soap, hand
sanitizer

Tissue, wash your
hands

2-m (6-ft)

N/A

Do not touch your eyes, nose,
or mouth

Brazil

40–60 s with
soap, 20–30 s
with alcohol

Soap, 70%
alcoholic
preparation

Tissue or arm

2-m

Face cover (Update on
April 5, 2020)

Avoid touching your eyes,
nose, and mouth with your
unwashed hands

Haiti

N/A

Soap

Elbow or disposable
handkerchief

2 steps, (Updated Facemask
on April 20, 2020)
3 steps

Remember to always wash
your hands before touching
your mouth, eyes and nose

All the information was only extracted from the government’s guidelines. Information from public news or other heath institution guidelines were exclude. The
terms were extracted directly from the government guidelines. N/A represents the information did not indicate in the guidelines.
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Table 3 What to do if you are sick
Countries

US

China

South Korea

UK

Brazil

Haiti

Avoid using public
transport and
crowded places

Stay home except to
get medical care.
Do not visit public
areas.
Avoid public
transportation, ride
sharing, or taxis.

Immediately go to
the designated
medical care
institution for having
specimen collection
and lab analysis and
follow the
quarantine protocols
as requested.
Avoid using public
transportations and
do not go to
crowded places

Do not go to school or
work avoid outdoor
activities

Stay at home and do
not meet up with other
people,
Only go outside for food,
health reasons or work
(but only if you cannot
work from home)

Avoid physical
contact with other
people, especially
the elderly and
chronically ill and
stay home until you
get better

Symptoms of acute
respiratory infection
should be placed
under observation
or quarantine
residential or
institutional
quarantine

Isolation days
and next steps

If have had no fever
for at least 72 h
without use of fever
reducing medication,
other symptoms
improved, and at
least 7 days have
passed since
symptoms first
appeared.
OR if no longer have
a fever, other
symptoms have
improved, and
receive 2 negative
tests in a row, 24 h
apart

All family members
and close contacts
required to take 14day quarantine

Take a rest at home and
monitor the symptoms
for 3-4 days
Consult with KCDC Call
center at 1339, a local
code+ 120 or a local
health center (visit a
triage health center
when fever (38 °C)
continues, or other
symptoms get worse

Stay home 7 days if
you have Coronavirus
symptoms.
After 7 days, if you feel
better, you can start your
usual routine again.

All residents are in
isolation for 14 days

Symptoms of acute
respiratory infection
should be placed
under observation
or quarantine
residential or
institutional
quarantine.

Face mask or cloth
face covering

[Sick person] should
wear a cloth face
covering, over your
nose and mouth if
you must be around
other people even at
home.
The caregiver should
wear [for cleaning
the sick person’s
bathroom] a mask/
cloth face covering
and wait as long as
possible after the
sick person has used
the bathroom

All family members
should wear a
disposable medical
face mask

If necessary [to contact
family or others] wear a
mask

N/A

The infected person:
Wear a mask at all
times

Recommended for
everyone leaving
their home (Update
on April 06, 2020)

Use a separate
room or bathroom

You should stay in a
specific “sick room”
if possible.
Use a separate
bathroom if available

N/A

Separate self from others
as much as possible. Use
a separate bathroom if
available (If it is
necessary to use a
common bathroom,
disinfect after use)

N/A

A room Used for
isolation.
In houses with only
one room, other
residents must sleep
in the living room,
away from the
infected patient
In the room used for
insolation, keep the
windows open for
air circulation. The
door must be closed
for the duration of
the insolation.

N/A

Sharing household
items

Avoid sharing
personal household
items: Do not share
dishes, drinking
glasses, cups, eating
utensils, towels, or
bedding with other
people in your home

N/A

Avoid sharing personal
household items (dishes,
drinking glasses, utensils,
towels, bedding) and
wash Used items
thoroughly after use

N/A

The waste produced
by the contaminated
patient needs to be
separated and
disposed. Bath
towels, forks, knives,
spoons, glasses and
other objects used
by the patient. Sofas
and chairs cannot be
shared either.

N/A
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Table 3 What to do if you are sick (Continued)
Countries

US

China

South Korea

UK

Brazil

Haiti

Sick room
ventilation

N/A

N/A

The isolation room must
close the door and open
window for ventilation

N/A

In the room used for
insolation, keep the
windows open for
air circulation. The
door must be closed
for the duration of
the isolation.

N/A

Cleaning
instructions

Wash [household]
items thoroughly
after use (with soap
and water or put in
the dishwasher).
Clean high-touch
surfaces in your
isolation area (“sick
room” and
bathroom) every
day; let caregiver
clean and disinfect
high-touch surfaces
in other areas of the
home. If a caregiver
needs to clean and
disinfect a sick
person’s bedroom
or bathroom, they
should do so on an
as-needed basis. The
caregiver should
wear a mask/cloth
face covering and
wait as long as
possible after the
sick person has
Used the bathroom.
Clean and disinfect
areas that may have
blood, stool, or body
fluids on them

[Confirmed COVID19 person’s]
residence, supplies,
cloth, beddings,
tableware and other
belongings have to
take the procedure
of final disinfection,
for future reuse.

If it is necessary to use a
common bathroom,
disinfect after use.
Wash used [household]
items thoroughly after
use.

N/A

Clean the handle [of
the door to the
room used for
isolation] frequently
with 70% alcohol or
bleach.
Household furniture
needs to be cleaned
frequently with
bleach or 70%
alcohol.
After using the
bathroom, never
[skip] washing your
hands with soap and
water and always
clean the toilet, sink
and other surfaces
with alcohol or
bleach to disinfect
the environment.

N/A

Call center for
COVID-19

N/A

N/A

KCDC Call center at 1339,
a local code+ 120

N/A

TeleSus 136

Call the Ministry of
Public Health’ s
center of
epidemiology
at 4343 3333

All the information was only extracted from the government’s guidelines. Information from public news or other heath institution guidelines were exclude. The
terms were extracted directly from the government guidelines. N/A represents the information did not indicate in the guidelines.

improvement of other symptoms, and the passage of at
least 7 days since symptom onset. Brazil and China advised that, in addition to the person with respiratory
symptoms, all family members or fellow residents were
to be quarantined for 14 days. In South Korea, any person who had COVID-19 symptoms was mandated to
stay at home for at least 3 to 4 days and was then called
and given advice by the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) call center.
To prevent the spread of the virus between family/
household members, the US, South Korea, and Brazil
recommended the ill person be confined to a separate
room and bathroom and avoid sharing personal household items. Haiti, China, and the UK did not provide
guidance on providing a separate room/bathroom or on
sharing personal items.
Isolation room ventilation, such as keeping the window open for air circulation or closing the door, were
mentioned in the South Korean and Brazilian guidelines.

Cleaning instructions for containing the virus were indicated in different ways in each country, except for in the
UK and Haiti. Call centers for COVID-19 were conducted in South Korea, Haiti, and Brazil in the very early
stages of the pandemic.
Theme: If you are sick
Sub theme: Threshold to contact a healthcare provider

Across the countries examined, the threshold symptoms
for when to contact healthcare providers varied. South
Korea advised sick people to contact a healthcare provider if the person had a fever (37.5 °C) or if symptoms
worsened. Brazil recommended seeking help if the ill
person experienced shortness of breath. The US advised
individuals to get medical attention if they experienced
persistent pain, chest pressure, cyanosis on lips or face,
new confusion, or if unable to be awakened. Haiti mentioned contacting a healthcare provider if the individual
had respiratory symptoms. Besides the usual respiratory
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acute signs (fever, shortness of breath), China also mentioned acute digestive tract symptoms as a reason to
reach out to a healthcare facility. In the UK, if a person’s
symptoms worsened to the point where they were having difficulty breathing, they were advised to go to the
hospital by ambulance facilitated by the online NHS
service.
Theme: If you are sick
Sub-theme: Transport to healthcare facilities

The US, South Korea, and China recommended using
personal vehicles and to avoid using public transportation to reach healthcare facilities, however South Korea
and China specified that individuals should cover their
face with a face mask before reaching healthcare facilities. Five of the countries allowed ambulance transport,
with the exclusion of China.

Discussion
WHO acknowledged and announced the impact of
COVID-19 on both public health and economic sectors
via two interim guidelines published in late March 2020.
WHO also emphasized the importance of preparedness
for the COVID-19 pandemic, accounting for the countries’ health care capacities [11, 12]. The six countries
tend to align with the WHO interim guideline, however
there are some differences in the response to the pandemic in each country.
The major differences in evaluation and testing criteria
in the guidelines across the six countries centered
around the priority of testing for COVID-19 in the
population, which strongly depended upon each country’s healthcare capacity including accessibility to healthcare providers, having enough testing kits and reagents,
availability of hospital beds, and so on. The most similar
recommendations in the evaluation and testing criteria
from each government were those pertaining to the clinical signs and symptoms, such as fever and respiratory
symptoms, as the priority criteria to initiate COVID-19
testing.
During the writing of this paper, there were no known
vaccine or antiviral therapies for COVID-19. Therefore,
early detection and diagnostic testing for SARS-CoV-2
were vital to reducing transmission, managing active
cases, contact tracing, and understanding epidemiology
[13]. The government guidelines concerning screening
criteria and capacity for screening – including screening
centers, and laboratory testing for COVID-19 in suspected or confirmed cases –were crucial factors in protecting the public from the virus. The WHO criticized
countries that had not prioritized testing for COVID-19.
Tedros Ghebreyesus, the chief executive of WHO, emphasized the importance of testing by stating, “The most
effective way to prevent infections and save lives is
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breaking the chains of transmission. You cannot fight a
fire blindfolded, and we cannot stop this pandemic if we
don’t know who is infected. We have a simple message
for all countries: test, test, test, test” [14]. However, lack
of reagents and/or testing capacity for the SARS-CoV-2
virus challenged all nations included in the study, at
least at the beginning of the pandemic. The US, UK,
Haiti, and Brazil, in particular, experienced problems
with shortages of testing kits for SARS-COV2 due to
rapidly increasing demand compounded by national supply chains under stress and national laboratories with
limited experience in COVID-19 virus testing [15, 16].
This had a negative impact by potentially obstructing
the expansion of COVID-19 testing criteria, resulting in
a narrowed range of people undergoing COVID-19 testing, which may have led to increases in the actual number of cases and overall risk of death by COVID-19, but
falsely decreased the number of confirmed cases and
deaths reported in the nations’ statistics.
According to the UK’s NHS, testing priority was given
to 1) intensive care unit patients with suspected coronavirus, 2) patients with severe respiratory illness including
pneumonia, 3) isolated cluster outbreaks, and 4) random
testing for surveillance purposes [17, 18]. The first 2
confirmed cases occurred in the UK on January 31, 2020
and the first COVID-19 victims died on March 7, 2020
(see Fig. 1). After 20 days, although the UK only tested
people who were admitted to hospitals, the number of
confirmed cases and disease-related deaths dramatically
increased (confirmed cases: 14,745, deaths: 1163) [19].
By April 7, 2020, 1 month after the first COVID-19
deaths, more than 1000 people were dying every day due
to viral infection (see Fig. 1). In April 9, 2020, despite
the thousands of citizens dying daily due to COVID-19
related causes, the UK government launched large
COVID-19 testing centers which prioritized processing
samples from health-care workers in self-isolation,
allowing them to go back to work [18]. Therefore,
people who were not considered a priority, such as nonhealth care providers or community members with mild
respiratory symptoms, were not given access to testing.
The limited scope of the UK’s testing approach for
COVID-19 was due to a capacity problem, resultant to
the consolidation in the number of pathology laboratories nationwide [18]. Many laboratories were centralized,
which led to the possibility that each hospital would not
necessarily be equipped with a fully functioning lab. This
systemic capacity problem may have increased the risk
of spread by free movement of people who were suspected of having the disease, since testing was unavailable to those individuals to enforce a stay-at-home
order. In the UK, 90,000 people were tested as of the
24th of March - around 1300 COVID-19 tests per million people. Although it was a higher portion than some
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Fig. 1 COVID-19 Cases in six countries

Page 11 of 16

nations, including the US (around 74 per million as of
the 16th of March), it was far behind South Korea (5200
per million as of the 17th of March) [20, 21].
Initially, the US’s CDC included fewer testing criteria
than the WHO guidelines. The CDC guidelines recommended testing individuals with a body temperature
above 38 °C (fever) and lower respiratory symptoms,
those who had a fever and a travel history to China, or
those who had a fever and were possibly exposed to a
suspected or confirmed COVID-19 case. However, once
a patient who did not have any travel history or exposure to any confirmed COVID-19 cases was reported
COVID-19 positive, the CDC expanded their testing criterion to include any individuals admitted to a hospital
due to lower respiratory symptoms and fever. This
addition broadened the spectrum of patients being
tested, but also led to rapid increase in the demand for
testing.
In February 2020, the CDC acquired, developed, and
distributed COVID-19 testing kits to laboratories nationwide, almost one hundred of which reported experiencing several issues with the testing kits. These issues
included the failure of negative controls and presentation of inconclusive results. After an internal investigation on February 12, 2020, the CDC reported a faulty
reagent as the issue. The CDC immediately recalled all
unreliable testing kits and promised to re-manufacture
the faulty component and distribute the newly developed
reagent to the public health labs as soon as possible. Ultimately, the shortage of COVID-19 test kits at this critical time point possibly interfered with the prevention of
increasing confirmed cases early in the outbreak. Furthermore, although the number of confirmed cases and
death rate significantly increased each day after March,
20, 2020 in the US (confirmed cases per day around 15,
000, deaths per day around 1000), only 97 public health
laboratories finished verification and were offering testing on May 6, 2020 [22]. As further evidence of inadequate testing capability, the CDC announced that
“although supplies of tests are increasing, it may still be
difficult to find a place to get tested” [22].
Together, the capacity for widespread testing and presence of prepared health facilities were key to controlling
the dissemination of coronavirus, as evidenced by South
Korea. The first COVID-19 incident in South Korea was
announced on January 31, 2020, with 7 confirmed cases.
The daily confirmed cases remained low for the following month (confirmed cases: 100, deaths: 1) until a super
spreader event was initiated on February 29, 2020. Each
day for 9 days afterward, the country’s epidemic curve
resembled a steep staircase as infections climbed, resulting in dramatically increased confirmed cases and deaths
(see Fig. 1). However, by implementing large-scale governmental COVID-19 testing, health officials were able
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to effectively contact trace and send potentially infected
people into quarantine as a preventative measure. By
March 25, 2020, more than 357,000 Koreans had been
tested. The country reported 10,804 total coronavirus
cases and 254 deaths as of May 1, 2020. This was the
lowest death rate among the countries examined [3, 23].
Having previously dealt with the Middle East respiratory
syndrome (MERS) in 2015, South Korea had already prepared for potential outbreaks of large-scale epidemics,
for example by installing negative pressure rooms in
hospitals in 2018. Additionally, the country rapidly developed large-scale availability of COVID-19 testing locations, such as K-Walk-Thru and Drive-thru testing
stations. These were the first testing centers of their kind
in the world and facilitated the quick and safe collection
of samples for COVID-19 testing. These unique centers
helped not only reduce the risk of cross infections at the
in-hospital testing centers, but also increased daily testing capacity amid rapidly rising rates of new cases [24].
WHO emphasized the prioritization of isolated care
for patients with higher risk of infection, such as severe
and critical illness patients aged over 60 years, and those
with underlying medical conditions [25]. Still, exponential escalation in the number of daily confirmed cases
placed enormous strain on national medical systems,
resulting in limited or total lack of beds for COVID-19
treatment. Therefore, the US, UK, South Korea, Brazil,
and Haiti decided patients with mild to moderate coronavirus symptoms should be observed in “Home Isolation”. This approach was a crucial option that only
required modification in individual behavior without
supplementary expenditure.
Interestingly, China opposed observing mild to moderate coronavirus cases at home, instead directing all potentially infected persons to designated medical care
institutions. This policy was initiated in Wuhan, the city
where COVID-19 emerged in early February 2020 [26].
On March 27, 2020, more than 60% of coronavirus cases
in the country were at Wuhan (see Fig. 1). The city converted exhibition centers and stadiums into shelter hospitals within mere weeks. Epidemiological evidence at
the beginning of the pandemic revealed high intrafamily
transmission, with 75–80% of all clustered infections diagnosed within families [26, 27]. Quickly emerging alternative hospitals, such as the Fangcang Shelter Hospitals,
dedicated to testing and admitting only COVID-19 patients may have led to a reduction in the spread of the
virus in the community, thereby decreasing the number
of new cases during the pandemic.
On January 22, 2020, the WHO announced the presence of travel-related cases linked to Wuhan City,
human-to-human transmission, and reported COVID-19
had been observed outside of China. The WHO strongly
advised individuals to report their travel history to their
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health care providers [28]. However, the UK did not
track travel history as it was not considered valuable information in their testing criteria. This was problematic
since people who traveled to COVID-19-occurring areas
could have potentially acted as carriers of the virus to
their respective communities and families, which might
have strongly influenced the increasingly steep confirmed case curves. Neither the American, Brazilian nor
Haitian governments considered a history of travel to a
region of high COVID-19 incidence to be a high priority
for testing, or to be an important criterion for suspected
cases. Those with a travel history to high spread areas
were only encouraged to seek testing if they developed a
fever or respiratory symptoms. In direct contrast, the
Chinese guidelines suggested that any travelers who
traveled to a region or country with occurrence of
COVID-19 must be tested, regardless of whether they
had developed symptoms.
Although WHO provided a definition of symptoms
observed in suspected cases that warranted further surveillance [11], it was a challenge to define the full clinical
characteristics of COVID-19. Fever (> 38 °C), breathing
problems, and chest radiographs showing bilateral lung
infiltrates were the main clinical signs and symptoms reported during the outbreak [13, 29]. For this reason,
most countries considered fever, respiratory symptoms,
and pneumonia as clinical justification for initiating
diagnostic testing. Although by March/April 2020, the
UK and US countries were defined as ‘countries experiencing larger outbreaks’ (as referred to in Group 4 of the
WHO guidelines), they did appear to be largely acting in
accordance with WHO advice at that point in time, despite not acting on the previous advice regarding the
screening of travelers [11].
Although there was ample evidence of human-tohuman transmission, the US and UK did not include
contact with confirmed or suspected cases as screening
criteria very early in the pandemic. The absence of this
criteria early in the pandemic may have led to increased
risk of viral spread. In contrast, South Korea undertook
an intense contact-tracing program: upon confirmation
of a COVID-19 case through laboratory testing, the
South Korean government conducted interviews with
the infected person, traced their travel history, used GPS
phone tracking, and checked their credit-card history.
The anonymized data detailing the travel history before
diagnosis was published on a public website by the
South Korean government. This allowed government officials to quickly release information about potential
COVID-19 exposed locations and help people who may
have been near those locations make quick decisions on
whether they needed to be tested. Though effective,
there were and continue to be concerns regarding individual privacy.
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With the global spike of COVID-19 and consequent
surge in suspected cases and geographic areas affected,
the need for implementing screening criteria to better
cope with each country’s capacity for screening and laboratory testing became increasingly evident. However,
beyond supply chain issues with provision of testing kits,
there were significant limitations of the government
guidelines for COVID-19 testing in several domains. National health systems and coverage of COVID-19 medical expenses were vital to fostering a sense of financial
certainty and a safe environment for those who were infected. Testing and treatment support came mainly or
totally from the government in South Korea, the UK,
China, and Brazil. All US citizens were covered for FDAapproved COVID-19 testing, regardless of private or federal insurance status, however, treatment coverage was
subject to the insurer’s policy. Despite the larger role the
governments took in most of the countries examined,
Haiti’s COVID-19 health care response was primarily financially supported by the private sector (60%). Hospitals and newly established screening clinics from the
private sector worked together with the Haitian Ministry
of Health to screen Haitians, however health care facilities from the private sector were not regulated by government officials (hence the paucity of government
screening guidelines) [30]. Given these limitations in
testing capacity, WHO launched the ‘COVID-Solidarity
Response Fund for WHO’ to support COVID-19 rapid
tests for low and middle-income countries [31].
In March 19, 2020, WHO recommended that “when
symptomatic, patients are required to wait, ensure they
have a separate waiting area” [32]. As an example of the
increased preparedness the WHO called for, the South
Korean government created temporary ‘Public Relief
Hospitals’ which provided isolated treatment rooms for
patients with respiratory and non-respiratory symptoms
to ensure safe medical services to general patients and to
prevent viral spread. Public Relief Hospitals were divided
into two types: Type A and Type B. Both had separate
outpatient treatment zones for patients without respiratory symptoms and for patients with respiratory symptoms but differed in whether their testing centers were
contained within the hospital. The Korean government
also permitted patients who have a chronic disease, but
did not have any respiratory symptoms, to receive counseling and prescriptions by telephone or by proxy, therefore decreasing the risk of internal cross-infection within
health care facilities for higher-risk patients. This approach was also utilized in the US and UK. In South
Korea, non-respiratory patients, such as cancer patients
or patients with heart problems, were directed to the
general outpatient area at a Public Relief Hospital. Patients with mild respiratory symptoms were directed to
see a doctor nearby, or to go to a respiratory outpatient
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area at a Public Relief Hospital. Suspected patients or
PUI who developed COVID-19 symptoms were referred
to a COVID-19 testing center after receiving guidance
from a competent clinic or the 1339 call center. Using
this triage workflow, Korean hospital systems were better able to prevent internal spreading of the COVID-19
virus in the hospitals and potentially reduced a higher
infection-related risk of mortality across the population.
The South Korean death rate provided evidence to support this hypothesis, showing that although they had a
high rate of confirmed cases (10,780), the total number
of deaths was only 250.
WHO recommended healthcare facilities limit the
number of visits to suspected or confirmed COVID-19
patients by health care providers, family members, and
visitors while being treated in health care facilities.
WHO also suggested maintaining a record of all staff
and visitors who entered suspected or confirmed
COVID-19 patients’ rooms [32]. Even though the US’s
federal guidance on hospital visitation seemed more liberal than other countries, especially when contrasted
with South Korea and the UK, more restrictions were
adopted depending on the local circumstances. For example, although limiting visitors was not advised by the
US CDC until April, several hospitals in New York city
restricted visitor access as early as March. Brazil’s government strongly recommended individuals with flu or
respiratory symptoms are not allowed entry to the hospitals. The government also recommend the hospitals reduce visitor numbers, which, while not mandatory, was
heavily implied to be. Although limitations of visitors
were not mandatory, wearing a face mask was
mandatory for all visitors in Haiti.
The figure illustrates the incidence of confirmed cases
and deaths in six countries from January to April.
Community guidelines
Theme: Prevent getting sick

Despite being consistently recommended for use by
symptomatic individuals and those in health-care settings, discrepancies were observed in the recommendations on wearing face masks in the general public and
community settings. The WHO consistently maintained
that the benefits of healthy people using masks in the
community setting was not supported by the current
evidence, and additionally could contribute to uncertainties or create critical risks [29]. This advice to decision
makers remained in place up until the time of this paper
submission in May 2020.
Several nations, such as the US and Brazil, changed
their face cover recommendations as new studies were
conducted that supported the use of face masks as an effective means to limit viral spread. Some studies may
under-estimate
their
protective
effects,
while
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observational studies exaggerate them [33]. However,
with the emerging evidence of asymptomatic or presymptomatic COVID-19 transmission, the authors note
that the community guidance regarding utilizing a face
mask and not sharing personal items could significantly
prevent potential asymptomatic or presymptomatic
transmission, which corroborates other publications
[16]. Mask shortages were prevalent across countries in
their early stage of use. For example, at the beginning of
the pandemic, there was a mask shortage in South Korea
due to mass panic-induced purchases by citizens. The
South Korean government requested manufacturers increase mask production, and then ensured the newly
manufactured masks were directly allocated to pharmacies where only a limited number of masks could be provided to individuals. The number of available masks was
displayed in government- and private sector-created
apps to prevent citizens from lining up outside pharmacies, which could have resulted in violating physical distancing measures. Additionally, the National Health
Insurance Service database showed how many masks
were sold to individuals per week.
Generally, the guidance provided across the six nations
regarding avoiding infection by washing hands or using
alcohol-based hand sanitizer frequently, performing respiratory etiquette when coughing or sneezing, and
avoiding touching the face corroborated the WHO
guidelines [34].
Despite physical distancing being vital to mitigating
the spread of the novel coronavirus, political beliefs affected
compliance with COVID-19 social distancing guidelines.
This was especially evident in the US, where, in general,
people who held contrasting political beliefs to the resident
state governing body were less responsive to stay-at-home
orders. For example, Republicans did not fully respect and
react to stay-at-home orders when Democratic counties announced the order. In a similar fashion, Democrats were
less likely to respond to stay-at-home orders when a Republican governor issued the decree [35].
On that point, it is worth noting that although the
countries examined all referred to the government issued COVID-19 notices as ‘guidelines,’ these notices
were not enforceable equally across countries. As an example, in the US, the CDC’s guidance acted as a framework that could be adapted for use by individual
hospitals or by local/state governments for legislative
purposes. However, in South Korea the guidelines essentially acted as enforceable legislation with serious financial repercussions.
Another important political development to note occurred in Brazil, when the Ministry of Health included a
video on their website focused on clarifying “fake news”
about the coronavirus. The video requested users confirm whether information presented in various medias
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was true before sharing that information with others. It
also suggested individuals consult with an official number via WhatsApp for information clarification and
communication.
An additional concern was raised regarding the use of
health-tracking apps. Various countries used voluntary
health-tracking apps to manage the COVID-19 pandemic either for informational, health vigilance, or contact tracing purposes. However, a unique aspect of the
South Korean response was the mandate for all Koreans
and long-term expatriates to install a health tracking app
for contact tracing purposes. Privacy concerns were
raised by several publications, some of whom referenced
the possibility of preserving data protection [36], while
others reflected on the legal implications and the need
to refine the data into an aggregate, rather than
individual-level data, to better deter the misuse of the
data [37].
The countries’ guidelines on how to care for people infected with COVID-19 experiencing mild symptoms at
home aligned with the WHO guidance [38]. According
to the WHO, ensuring the sick person used a separate
room and bathroom in the home would be essential to
containing the virus, however, only the US, South Korea,
and Brazil made this recommendation to their respective
communities. Haiti, the UK, and China did not mention
this recommendation in their guidelines. Although those
suspected of contracting the coronavirus were requested
to stay at home in the UK, limited information was provided to guide the home care process, such as how to
disinfect the ill person’s room or how to handle sharing
household items in the home. In China, all people suspected of having the coronavirus were instructed to seek
testing at a testing center and were admitted to ‘Fangcang Shelter Hospitals.’ Therefore, it could be argued it
was not necessary to provide information to the community on how to deal with sick people at home. The decision to advise all people suspected of having the
coronavirus to go directly to the hospital is at odds with
at least one study, which proposed that instead of guiding the COVID-19 patient to seek healthcare facilities, it
would be preferable to provide at-home testing and
monitoring [39]. However, while staying at home it is
critical to carefully monitor worsening symptoms since
medical care is not necessarily immediately available.
The symptom thresholds to contact healthcare providers varied between countries, with a wider array of
symptoms (beyond the respiratory types) being included
by countries that had dealt with the epidemic for longer
periods of time. Clearly a great deal of clinical judgement was necessary for monitoring disease progression,
since acting in a timely manner to differentiate a more
serious case of COVID-19 was crucial to limiting
fatality.
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Finally, WHO provided information regarding the
transportation of patients with confirmed and suspected
COVID-19 to referral health care facilities, however,
WHO did not give any information regarding transport
mode to individuals with suspected COVID-19 [40]. The
guidelines on transportation to healthcare facilities varied in emphasis between governments. A publication
from China showed key involvement of public transportation in the dissemination of coronavirus. According to
the study, the daily frequency of public transportation
entrance and exit from Wuhan was significantly related
to the number of COVID-19 cases in other cities [41].
When traveling to a hospital due to the presence of potential COVID-19 symptoms, wearing a face mask, using
a personal vehicle, avoiding public transports and/or
calling an ambulance were recommended by the Korean,
US, and Chinese government’s guidelines. The UK and
Haiti advised such patients utilize ambulance transport
when heading to the hospital. The Brazilian government
did not provided advice regarding transport mode.
Limitations

These findings are related to the guidelines for healthcare facilities and communities, as updated until April
20, 2020, however some guidelines may have been continuously updated beyond this date. In Haiti, because of
the low prevalence of COVID-19 (total confirmed case:
100, deaths: 8 as of May 1, 2020), some information was
unable to be obtained from the government guidelines,
even though it was provided by news outlets or other
medias, which were not included here. This study only
used government guidelines accessible by the public,
which may have limited the scope of the study’s usable
information.

Conclusion
In summary, all six countries updated their guidelines,
especially screening criteria, as the incidence of COVID19 increased to take more aggressive actions against the
progression of COVID-19 spread and to help “flatten the
curve,” thus easing some of the burden on the respective
healthcare systems. In the initial stages of the outbreak,
certain strategies were universally employed to control
the deadly virus’s spread, including quarantining the
sick, contact tracing, and social distancing. However,
these measures would have limited value if the people
suspected of contracting the disease were not tested. It
is difficult, if not impossible, to identify any one factor as
the greatest cause for coronavirus dissemination, but by
comparing these countries’ approaches it is possible to
identify multiple factors that contribute to an overall effective strategy for reducing its spread. Additionally,
there are multiple characteristics that influence the
prevalence and incidence of COVID-19, including
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population density, differences in healthcare infrastructure, and primary means of transportation. Future studies should focus in more detail on these factors and their
influence on the prevalence and incidence of COVID-19.
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